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“Outside the Institute there is a Desert”:
The Tenuous Trajectories of Medical Research
in Interwar Australia
PETER GRAEME HOBBINS*
Throughout the fin de sie `cle, medical research institutes increasingly hallmarked
“modernity” across industrialized nations and their colonies.
1 While the reification of
these “veritable laboratory Xanadus” as insular centres for pure science has recently
been questioned,
2 the absence of such facilities in Australia prior to the First World
War had enduring ramifications for public, political and professional perceptions of
scientific medicine. Indeed, the handful of establishments that arose between 1910 and
1939 merit attention precisely because they so patently embodied local projections of
“medical research”. Underpinned by a pragmatic progressivism, yet constrained by fealty
to empire, the enterprises emerging during this period were predominantly British in fla-
vour and modern in their ideals. In both form and function, however, the early Australian
research institutes were never simple facsimiles of international models. Instead, each
was shaped by local accommodations in defining its mission and value within a culture
often indifferent—and not infrequently hostile—to basic research. Indeed, each of these
ventures constituted an experiment, or rather a contingent series of experiments, to trian-
gulate itself within a favourable medical, social and political space.
Yet the development of the early Antipodean research institutes resists a teleological
reading. Most subsisted with fewer than ten to fifteen staff, and many stagnated or
failed outright. In the absence of a stable funding base or a groundswell of investigators
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1determined to make a career of research, these enterprises could have reverted to the sta-
tus of little more than diagnostic laboratories. In responding to the challenge laid down
by Steve Sturdy and Roger Cooter a decade ago,
3 this article explicates the circum-
stances and strategies by which laboratory-based science negotiated a place in Australian
medicine. My focus lies primarily with the most successful establishment, Melbourne’s
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Research in Pathology and Medicine, directed between
1923 and 1944 by Charles Kellaway (1889–1952). I argue that Kellaway’s willingness to
experiment with the form, function and funding of the Hall Institute not only ensured its
own survival, but created exemplars and infrastructure that fostered medical research as a
locally viable career.
Isolated Endeavours
By the outbreak of the First World War, “research” embodied several overlapping
practices in Australian medicine. Reflecting its British origins, there was a strong clinical
tradition of publishing noteworthy cases or cohorts, which gradually incorporated scien-
tific investigations as an aid to stabilizing disease definitions.
4 The confluence of labora-
tory techniques with epidemiological surveys likewise served the ambitions of public
health physicians, whether curbing the spread of diphtheria along remote railway lines
or elucidating the transmission of plague in Australia’s most populous city.
5 The nation’s
medical schools—at the universities of Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney—were predo-
minantly centres for vocational instruction.
6 Occasionally, however, they accommodated
inspired embryological, anatomical or physiological researchers such as Charles Martin
or Grafton Elliot Smith, whose comparative methodologies flowed seamlessly into zoology
or anthropology and advanced Australian biology beyond its nineteenth-century cata-
loguing mission.
7 Isolated in a different sense were clinician researchers who explored
multifarious phenomena from filariasis to bites by Australia’s venomous fauna.
8
What united these disparate conceptions of research, however, was that they were
rarely projected as a corporate enterprise. Indeed, most Australian research projects
undertaken prior to 1914 were piecemeal, part-time and lacking the approbation of the
3Steve Sturdy and Roger Cooter, ‘Science,
scientific management, and the transformation of
medicine in Britain c.1870–1950’, Hist. Sci., 1998,
36: 421–66, p. 449.
4John C Burnham, ‘Biomedical communication
and the reaction to the Queensland childhood lead
poisoning cases elsewhere in the world’, Med. Hist.,
1999, 32: 155–72, pp. 156–60; K S Inglis, Hospital
and community: a history of the Royal Melbourne
Hospital, Melbourne University Press, 1958,
pp. 124–5.
5Margaret Spencer, John Howard Lidgett
Cumpston, C.M.G., M.D., D.P.H., Tenterfield, NSW,
Margaret Spencer, 1987, p. 99; P H Curson, Times of
crisis: epidemics in Sydney 1788–1900, Sydney
University Press, 1985, pp. 138–58.
6Ann Mozley Moyal, ‘Medical research in
Australia: a historical perspective’, Search, 1981, 12:
302–9, p. 302; K F Russell, The Melbourne Medical
School 1862–1962, Melbourne University Press,
1977, pp. 123–6.
7Harriette Chick, ‘Charles James Martin.
1866–1955’, Biog. Mem. Fellows R. Soc., 1956, 2:
172–208, pp. 175–7; Barbara J Hawgood, ‘Sir Charles
James Martin MB FRS: Australian serpents and
Indian plague, one-hundred years ago’, Toxicon,
1997, 35: 999–1010, pp. 1001–7; Patricia Morison,
J T Wilson and the Fraternity of Duckmaloi,
Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1997, pp. 98–100.
8John Pearn and Kenneth D Winkel, ‘Toxinology
in Australia’s colonial era: a chronology and
perspective of human envenomation in nineteenth
century Australia’, Toxicon, 2006, 48: 726–37,
pp. 732–4; R Doherty, ‘Australia’s contribution to
tropical health: past and present’, Med. J. Aust., 1993,
158: 552–7, pp. 552–3.
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2centres in which they were conducted. Even the most productive collaborations, such as
the “Fraternity of Duckmaloi” forged by Martin, James Wilson and James Hill at Sydney
University in the 1890s, were short-lived and rarely survived the departure of the princi-
pal investigators.
9 The same fate essentially befell the prototypical institutes that flow-
ered briefly before the First World War, including the Pasteur Institute of Australia
(1888–98) and the New South Wales Bureau of Microbiology (1908–13).
10 Further
proposals for formalized centres of investigation—such as an Institute of Preventive
Medicine in Victoria (1891)—remained stillborn.
11 This absence of dedicated facilities
did not, of course, preclude continuance of local clinical, laboratory or epidemiological
studies. However, the dearth of centres offering scientific and pedagogical continuity
shaped the perceptions and practice of Australian medical science well into the new cen-
tury. This attitude is exemplified by the Commonwealth government’s first support for
such research, which comprised an annual grant to subsidize tropical medicine studies
in Britain.
12
Historians largely cite the First World War as the predominant reason for the growth
in Australian medical research. This argument comprises three main historiographic
threads. The first is an emphasis on population health prompted by appalling wartime
casualty lists.
13 The second is the recognition that Australia had to mobilize local
resources to fend off threats to national health.
14 The third thread relates to military-
medical exchange, particularly the exposure of Australian doctors to modern British
methods of hygiene, bacteriology, surgery and research whilst serving overseas.
15 These
factors converged with a growing popular perception of health as a fundamental right,
16
9Morison, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 88–116.
10Stephen Dando-Collins, Pasteur’s gambit: Louis
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in Australia, Kensington, NSW, University of New
South Wales, 1988, pp. 25–37; Peter J Tyler, ‘“A
pathologist of distinction”: Frank Tidswell,
1867–1941’, Individuals & institutions in the history of
medicine: proceedings of the 6th biennial conference of
The Australian Society of the History of Medicine,
Sydney, The Organising Committee of the 6th Biennial
Conference of the Australian Society of the History of
Medicine, 1999, pp. 1–4.
11This venture was mooted by Melbourne
University’s professor of medicine, Harry Brookes
Allen. See Vivianne de Vahl Davis, ‘Sir Harry Allen
and the foundation of the Walter and Eliza Hall
Institute of Medical Research’, Hist. Rec. Aust. Sci.,
1980, 5: 31–8, p. 32; Inglis, op. cit., note 4 above,
pp. 125–6.
12The amount was £200 per annum from 1905 to
1910. See Lorraine Harloe, ‘Anton Breinl and the
Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine’, in Roy
MacLeod and Donald Denoon (eds), Health and
healing in tropical Australia and Papua New Guinea,
Townsville, James Cook University, 1991, pp. 35–46,
on p. 39.
13J H L Cumpston, The health of the people:
a study in federalism, Canberra, Roebuck, 1978,
p. 30.
14A H Brogan, Committed to saving lives: a
history of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories,
South Yarra, Hyland House, 1990, pp. 1–11; Claire
Hooker and Alison Bashford, ‘Diphtheria and
Australian public health: bacteriology and its complex
applications, c.1890–1930’, Med. Hist., 2002, 46:
41–64, pp. 55–7.
15Roy MacLeod, ‘From imperial to national
science’, in Roy MacLeod (ed.), The commonwealth
of science: ANZAAS and the scientific enterprise in
Australasia, 1888–1988, Melbourne and Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 40–72, on p. 60;
Earle Page, Truant surgeon: the inside story of forty
years of Australian political life, Sydney, Angus &
Robertson, 1963, pp. 42–4.
16Grant Rodwell, ‘Lessons from the First
World War: Drs Harvey Sutton and J S Purdy:
Sydney’s Health Week: 1921–1950’, Individuals &
institutions in the history of medicine, op. cit., note 10
above, pp. 1–4, on p. 2; Cumpston, op. cit., note 13
above, p. 16.
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3at a time when the colonial image of the generalist practitioner was being surpassed by
conceptions of medicine as a collective scientific endeavour.
17
Beyond the Armistice, however, local research continued to be stymied by the absence
of supportive structures. Australia between the wars has been characterized as a nation
turning in on itself: proud of its military record, scarred by its wartime sacrifice and exhi-
biting deep, parochial pessimism towards intellectual endeavours of almost any flavour.
18
Yet public mistrust of science after the technological horrors of the war competed with a
growing—if grudging—progressivist acceptance of “expertise”. Research was accommo-
dated not to generate fundamental knowledge, but pragmatically to solve pressing techni-
cal problems in pursuit of nationalefficiencies.
19 While such initiatives assisted Australian
self-sufficiency, Roy MacLeod in particular has argued that ongoing local deference to
British expertise perpetuated an enervated “Commonwealth science”.
20
Indeed, Australians graduating after 1918 rarely entertained a scientific career in their
homeland. Frederick Courtice cites the haphazard nature of previous research projects
and ongoing Dominion fealty to Britain to explain why local research programmes
were starved of talented individuals.
21 He identifies several aspects of this phenomenon,
including the constraints of Australian scientific isolation, the appeal of London and the
ease with which Australians—as British citizens—could win Imperial scholarships to
undertake research in the UK. Rod Home extends this argument, positing the Royal
Society as “an empire-wide system of scientific patronage and reward that helped keep
colonial science firmly bound to that of the metropolis”.
22 Hugh Hamersley further con-
tends that the absence of a local tradition of full-time research presented two substantial
barriers for the Australian scientific centres that developed after 1910.
23 A lack of oppor-
tunity and tutelage denied promising investigators the means to further their ambitions,
while those who persevered found no local models or mentors. Thus researchers respon-
sible for running the enterprises that faltered into existence during the interwar period
had precious few precedents or pathways to follow.
17T S Pensabene, The rise of the medical
practitioner in Victoria, Canberra, Australian
National University, 1980, pp. 159, 177; James
Gillespie, ‘Medical markets and Australian medical
politics, 1920–45’, Labour Hist., 1988, 54: 30–46.
18MacLeod, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 59–60,
64–5.
19For instance, Kate Murphy, ‘The “most
dependable element of any country’s manhood”:
masculinity and rurality in the Great War and its
aftermath’, Hist. Aust., 2009, 5: 72.1–20, pp. 72.9–10;
C B Schevdin, Shaping science and industry: a
history of Australia’s Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research, 1926–49, Sydney, Allen &
Unwin, 1987, p. 38.
20Roy MacLeod, ‘Science, progressivism, and
“practical idealism”: reflections on efficient
imperialism and federal science in Australia,
1895–1915’, in Roy MacLeod and Richard Jarrell
(eds), Dominions apart: reflections on the culture of
science and technology in Canada and Australia
1850–1945, Ontario, Canadian Science and
Technology Historical Association, 1994, pp. 7–25,
on p. 24.
21F C Courtice, ‘Research in the medical
sciences: the road to national independence’, in
R W Home (ed.), Australian science in the making,
Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 277–307, on
pp. 285–7.
22R W Home, ‘A world-wide scientific network
and patronage system: Australian and other “colonial”
fellows of the Royal Society of London’, in
R W Home and Sally Gregory Kohstedt (eds),
International science and national scientific identity:
Australia between Britain and America, Dordrecht,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, pp. 151–80, on
p. 151.
23Hugh Hamersley, ‘Cancer, physics and society:
interactions between the wars’, in Home (ed.), op.
cit., note 21 above, pp. 197–219, on pp. 198–200.
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4Localindustrydidnot fillthevoid.Unliketheexpandingcommercialresearchventuresin
Europe and North America,
24 the Australian pharmaceutical industry remained essentially a
manufactory and importer of overseas innovations until at least the Second World War.
25
Commonwealth support for commercial innovation grew during the interwar years via the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, but its remit never extended to medical or
pharmaceutical science.
26 However, Council studies in animal nutrition and disease did
occasionally intersect with medical science, as did work at the Queensland Stock Institute
in Brisbane and the Waite Agricultural Research Institute in Adelaide.
27
An enduring medical research culture was also rare within Australian universities.
Although medical faculties had grudgingly increased preclinical science teaching within
their curricula, it was not until the 1930s that medical schools and teaching hospitals mean-
ingfully engaged with Flexnerian reforms to medical education.
28 In contrast to the philan-
thropic cornucopia trailing in Abraham Flexner’s wake across the northern hemisphere,
Australian facultiesstruggledagainst escalatingteachingloads andstiflingpecuniarylimita-
tions. For instance, in 1925 Melbourne University had only £2400 invested for medical
research; by 1932 its annual disbursement remained a mere £824, less than a single
professor’s salary.
29 When Richard Berry—the University’s professor of anatomy—was
asked in 1925 how research could be made appealing to students, he remarked:
I had the same question put to me twenty years ago ...The prevailing idea then was, as it is now
apparently, that we expect the young graduate in medicine ...to do research work for which he has
no training whatever, at remuneration varying from £50 to £150 per annum. He has no experience,
and knows very little about it. The position to-day is practically as it was then.
30
Furthermore, the limited number of faculties and the historical absence of a vigorous
research culture meant that—unlike Britain
31—there was no cadre of ambitious
24For example, E M Tansey, ‘The Wellcome
Physiological Research Laboratories 1894–1904: the
Home Office, pharmaceutical firms, and animal
experiments’, Med. Hist., 1989, 33: 1–41, pp. 35–41;
Nicolas Rasmussen, ‘The moral economy of the drug
company—medical scientist collaboration in interwar
America’, Soc. Stud. Sci., 2004, 34: 161–85,
pp. 163–8; Alison Li, J.B. Collip and the development
of medical research in Canada: extracts and
enterprise, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2003, pp. 41–2, 57–8.
25See, for instance, R Grenville Smith and
Alexander Barrie, Aspro—how a family business
grew up, Melbourne, Nicholas International, 1976;
John F T Grimwade, A short history of Drug Houses
of Australia Ltd to 1968, Richmond, John F T
Grimwade, 1974.
26MacLeod, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 64–5;
Schevdin, op. cit., note 19 above, pp. 36–8, 49.
27Dando-Collins, op. cit., note 10 above,
pp. 304–5; Claire Hooker, Irresistible forces:
Australian women in science, Carlton, Melbourne
University Press, 2004, pp. 127–8.
28Russell, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 98–117;
Morison, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 126–9; Peter
McPhee, ‘Pansy’: a life of Roy Douglas Wright,
Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 1999, pp. 21–3.
29George A Syme, Royal Commission on Health.
Minutes of evidence, Melbourne, Commonwealth of
Australia, 1925, p. 227; McPhee, op. cit., note 28
above, pp. 38–9.
30Syme, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 233.
A comfortable professional existence in mid-1920s
Australia might entail a salary of £500 per annum;
university lecturers earned £600 and professors £900
(Robert Murray, The confident years: Australia in the
twenties, London, Allen Lane, 1978, pp. 142, 172).
31See, for example, Steve Sturdy, ‘From the
trenches to the hospitals at home: physiologists,
clinicians and oxygen therapy, 1914–30’, in John
V Pickstone (ed.), Medical innovations in historical
perspective, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992,
pp. 104–23; Steve Sturdy, ‘War as experiment:
physiology, innovation and administration in Britain,
1914–1918: the case of chemical warfare’, in Roger
Cooter, Mark Harrison and Steve Sturdy (eds), War,
medicine and modernity, Thrupp, Stroud, Sutton
Publishing, 1998, pp. 65–84; David Cantor, ‘The
MRC’s support for experimental radiology during
the inter-war years’, in Joan Austoker and Linda
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5academics clamouring to expand their clinical stature or to promulgate research-driven
pedagogy.
32 By 1935, the need for a more conducive culture was seen as pressing:
“Senior men lament the present necessary frustration of their aspirations both as personal
contributors to knowledge and as directors of the efforts of the younger men they have
inspired.”
33 Yet while medical academics played key roles in establishing several of
the early research institutes in Australia, their support bespoke a view of research as
an activity best undertaken beyond the campus.
34 Even in 1948, Melbourne University’s
professor of bacteriology, Sydney Rubbo, could observe that:
The tendency has been here in Australia to establish units in medical research institutes outside the
universities because research is a full time job ...and hence a university whose time is devoted
largely to teaching is not such a fruitful source in which to spend money.
35
Admittedly, Cancer Research Committees were formed at both Melbourne and Sydney
Universities in1915and1922,respectively.
36 While theformerpursueda low-keytrajectory
directed by physicist Thomas Laby, the Sydney venture traced a spectacular parabola under
its indifferent professor of physiology,Henry Chapman. The Sydney Cancer Research Com-
mittee coordinated a substantial research programme that was disseminated across the cam-
pus and several local hospitals—what might now be classed a “virtual institute”. However,
despite riding high on a bounty of donations and promising experimental results—certainly
it wasthe mostwell-resourcedventure by1929—theprogramme was moribundby1934and
wound up in 1938. Although the associated tale of adultery, misappropriated funds and
scientific myopia is diverting in itself, the Sydney experience moreover offers a salutary
counterpoint to narratives of biomedical ascendance. Indeed, late into the 1930s the unsup-
portive university climate continued to drive luminaries such as Hugh Ward, Frederic
Wood Jones and Roy “Pansy” Wright to better-funded schools abroad. Students eager to
carve out a local career in medical science thus found few models at their alma maters.
Manyturned,instead,tothehandfulofformalresearchinstitutesthathadevolvedafter1910.
The Institutional Topography
The earliest of the formal medical research institutes to be configured as such was the
Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine (AITM), opened on 1 January 1910.
37 In the
Bryder (eds), Historical perspectives on the role of
the MRC: essays in the history of the Medical
Research Council of the United Kingdom and its
predecessor, the Medical Research Committee,
1913–1953, Oxford University Press, 1989,
pp. 181–204, on pp. 200–3.
32Although naturally, individual exceptions
existed; see Hamersley, op. cit., note 23 above,
p. 200; James Guest, John Hunter’s disciple—
Frederic Wood Jones, Vicary Lecture, 1989, London,
Royal College of Surgeons of England, 1989, pp. 4–7.
33University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter
UMA), Melbourne, ASAP 3/3/85, Folder 8/7,
‘Memorandum on University Medical School
development and the market site’, 9 Apr. 1936, p. 4.
34For instance, de Vahl Davis, op. cit., note 11
above; Moyal, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 302.
35Australian National University, ‘Medical
Research in Australia: report of proceedings of the
conference convened by the Interim Council at the
request of Sir Howard Florey, F.R.S.’, Canberra,
3–4 April 1948, p. 9.
36Hamersley, op. cit., note 23 above.
37The AITM is by far the most studied—and
theorized—of the early Australian research institutes;
see, for instance, J H L Cumpston, ‘The Australian
Institute of Tropical Medicine’, Med. J. Aust., 1923,
1: 398–400; R A Douglas, ‘Dr Anton Breinl and the
Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine, part 1’,
Med. J. Aust., 1977, 1: 713–16; ibid., part 2, Med. J.
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6post-Federation era, this annexe to the Townsville Hospital represented an important step
for Australian investment in health, being supported in part by the Queensland
government and—increasingly after 1914—Commonwealth funding.
38 The research pol-
icy established by the first director—the Viennese protozoologist Anton Breinl—initially
paralleled similar ventures in India and the Federated Malay States,
39 namely facilitating
imperial commercial progress by optimizing the health of both white and “native”
labour. However, in quantifying physiological aspects of “the great experiment of popu-
lating tropical Australia by a white working community”, the AITM’s research increas-
ingly drew inspiration from American investigations in the Philippines.
40 From 1921 the
institute’s course skewed again when it fell under the aegis of the newly formed Com-
monwealth Department of Health and its autocratic Director-General, (John) Howard
Cumpston. Complementing the profusion of Commonwealth Health Laboratories that
fanned out across the Australian landscape in the 1920s, the AITM fulfilled an increas-
ingly instrumental role as a diagnostic laboratory for disease classification and epide-
miology, and as a mouthpiece for public health promotion.
41 Indeed, Cumpston and a
new, non-experimentalist overseer, Raphael Cilento, envisaged the institute as a nexus
for projecting Australian medical expertise outwards to the imperial Pacific territories.
42
However, this vision waned in the latter half of the 1920s—along with the AITM’s scien-
tific output and its Commonwealth funding—and the facility closed, transmogrifying in
1930 into the School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine at Sydney University.
Nevertheless, federal interest in health extended beyond tropical medicine. Opened in
1918, the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL) was not primarily a research ven-
ture; rather, it was a manufacturing plant inaugurated to reverse Australia’s dependence
on imported sera and vaccines.
43 In his previous guise as national Director of Quarantine,
Cumpston had been instrumental in realizing this federally owned enterprise, although
the titular director at its inception was William Penfold, a British-trained bacteriologist.
While CSL’s structure included allowance for research and development work, it
was only after Penfold was replaced in 1927 by the Australian bacteriologist Frederick
Morgan that the Laboratories were permitted to undertake epidemiological, micro-
biological, immunological and therapeutic investigations. A dedicated research depart-
ment was formally established in 1934, at which point Morgan projected CSL as a
Aust., 1977, 1: 748–51; ibid., part 3, Med. J. Aust.,
1977, 1: 784–90; Harloe, op. cit., note 12 above.
38M Roe, ‘The establishment of the Australian
Department of Health: its background and
significance’, in Cumpston, op. cit., note 13 above,
pp. v–xxiii, on p. xxii; Moyal, op. cit., note 6 above,
pp. 302–3.
39Arnold, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 13–16;
Parmer, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 56.
40Warwick Anderson, ‘Geography, race and
nation: remapping “tropical” Australia, 1890–1930’,
Hist. Rec. Aust. Sci., 1997, 11: 457–68, p. 463.
41Andrew Parker, ‘A “complete protective
machinery”—classification and intervention through
the Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine,
1911–1928’, Health Hist., 1999, 1: 181–200,
pp. 189–94; F G Morgan, ‘The Commonwealth
Serum Laboratories and their work’, Coll. Proc. Soc.
Chem. Ind. Victoria, 1935, 35: 1015–31, pp. 1019–20;
Malcolm Whyte, A global scientist: Douglas H. K.
Lee, Gundaroo, Brolga Press, 1995, pp. 27–31.
42Fedora Gould Fisher, Raphael Cilento: a
biography, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press,
1994, pp. 40, 46–8; Warwick Anderson, The
cultivation of whiteness: science, health and racial
destiny in Australia (2nd ed.), Carlton, Melbourne
University Press, 2005, pp. 162–4; Alexander
Cameron-Smith, ‘Australian imperialism and
International Health in the Pacific Islands’, Aust. Hist.
Stud., 2010, 41 (in press).
43Brogan, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 1;
W J Penfold, ‘The Commonwealth Serum
Laboratories’, Med. J. Aust., 1923, 1: 396–400.
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7semi-autonomous “institute”: “It would be a mistake to regard the Commonwealth
Serum Laboratories as purely an institution for the commercial manufacture of biological
products, though it may be of interest to know that the Institute is entirely self-
supporting.”
44 A Commonwealth Radium Laboratory was also instigated in Melbourne
in 1928 to disburse £100,000 worth of radium purchased from federal funds for cancer
treatment, but this remained largely a coordination, standardization and occupational
health concern rather than a research venture.
45
The same was essentially true of the microbiology and pathology laboratories funded
by individual states such as South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland.
Although opportunistic studies were initiated at these facilities—such as Edward “Ted”
Derrick’s mid-1930s investigation of Q fever—such research was infrequent and
remained entirely subservient to routine diagnostic work.
46 Ambitious researchers, how-
ever, agitated for the evolution of the Adelaide laboratory into the Institute of Medical
and Veterinary Science (IMVS) in 1938, while its northern counterpart begat the
Queensland Institute of Medical Research in 1946.
47 The federal government also sup-
ported the Commonwealth Institute of Anatomy, which opened in Canberra in 1931.
This enormous accumulation of indigenous fauna was first housed in Melbourne as the
Australian Institute of Anatomical Research (1919), before being donated to the Common-
wealth government in 1924 under the initial title of the National Museum of Australian
Zoology.
48 While small-scale investigations were undertaken into comparative physiol-
ogy, human nutrition and childhood development, the Institute of Anatomy never
approached its goal of becoming “comparable with the Hunterian Museum of the Royal
College of Surgeons ... the centre of research into the advance of medical science in
Australia”.
49
The remaining establishments that arose prior to the Second World War more closely
resembled international models of dedicated research facilities such as the Lister or
Pasteur Institutes. These included Melbourne’s Hall Institute (inaugurated in 1915 but
in abeyance until 1919) and the Thomas Baker, Alice Baker and Eleanor Shaw Medical
Research Institute (1927).
50 Sydney boasted the Institute of Pathological Research of
44Morgan, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 1016,
1020–3.
45Hamersley, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 206–11,
214–15.
46Robin A Cooke, ‘Q fever. Was Edward
Derrick’s contribution undervalued?’, Med. J. Aust.,
2008, 189: 660–2; Macfarlane Burnet, Changing
patterns: an atypical autobiography, Melbourne,
William Heinemann, 1968, pp. 100–4.
47E Weston Hurst, ‘The Institute of Medical
and Veterinary Science’, Aust. J. Sci., 1941, 4:
10–11; E H Derrick, ‘The birth of the Queensland
Institute of Medical Research’, Med. J. Aust., 1972,
2: 952–9.
48A J Proust, ‘Sir Colin MacKenzie and the
Institute of Anatomy’, Med. J. Aust., 1994, 161: 60–2;
Stuart Braga, ANZAC doctor: the life of Sir Neville
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(accessed 25 Aug. 2009).
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8New South Wales (1920, renamed the Kolling Institute of Medical Research in 1931)
and the Kanematsu Memorial Institute of Pathology (1933).
51 Paralleling the emergence
of diagnostic bacteriological laboratories earlier in the century,
52 all of these institutes
were situated adjacent to metropolitan teaching hospitals and were frequently referred
to—even by their proponents—as appendages subsisting off their hosts. Their primary
role was likewise couched clinically as the provision of routine laboratory investigations,
with original work only to be undertaken when time permitted. Perhaps where these
institutes most differed was in their relationships with universities. Some, like the Baker,
Kolling and Kanematsu Institutes, had few administrative or instructional ties, while the
Hall Institute and the IMVS promulgated closer associations with local medical faculties,
albeit subservient to hospital-institute bonds. None, however, shared a stable financial
base, remaining dependent on tenuous amalgams of private or public philanthropy,
admixed with hospital service fees and intermittent state government subsidies.
53
Transplanted Templates and Team Work
If, as I contend, these early Australian facilities constituted distinct experiments with
the form, function and rhetoric of local medical research, what was the medium in which
they grew or withered? Where did their models arise, and how were they projected and
promulgated? Moreover, what factors allowed certain configurations to prosper and be
carried forward as prototypes for the less straitened circumstances after 1945?
It is unsurprising that directors of these nascent institutes modelled their facilities upon
international exemplars; until the 1940s, Australian doctors desirous of specializing or pur-
suing a research careerhad few options but to travel “home” to Britain.
54 Many sojourned at
the Lister Institute under the tutelage of Charles Martin, whose encouragement of Antipo-
dean science—“the Martin spirit”—endured from his 1890s tenure in Australia until his
death in 1955.
55 Frank Macfarlane Burnet, for example, observed from London: “I have a
terrific respect for C J Martin and if he definitely advises me to any course of action it
will take a great deal of moral courage to go counter to it.”
56 Several key AITM
staff were also recruited from the Lister, while Breinl had directed Liverpool’s Runcorn
Laboratory before entering his iron-roofed shack in Townsville.
57 In 1916, William
51David S Nelson, ‘The Kolling Institute of
Medical Research’, Med. J. Aust., 1985, 143: 97–101;
F C Courtice, ‘The Kanematsu Memorial Institute of
Pathology: the Inglis era, 1933–60’, Hist. Rec. Aust.
Sci., 1985, 6: 115–36; Paul C Vincent and Belinda
L Vincent, ‘The Kanematsu Institute 1933–1982’, in
Harold Attwood, Richard Gillespie and Milton James
Lewis (eds), New perspectives on the history of
medicine: first national conference of the Australian
Society of the History of Medicine, Melbourne,
University of Melbourne and the Australian Society
of the History of Medicine, 1990, pp. 261–70.
52Hooker and Bashford, op. cit., note 14 above,
p. 51.
53For instance, see Syme, op. cit., note 29 above,
pp. 226–7, 230–1.
54See Anon., ‘Post-graduate work in London’,
The Speculum, June 1925: 22–5; Ian J Wood,
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autobiography, Toorak, Ian J Wood, 1984, pp. 20–7;
Burnet, op. cit., note 46 above, pp. 37–41.
55Two biographies of Martin are currently in
preparation; for his influence on Australia, see
Morison, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 406–10; Richard
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5–6; Hawgood, op. cit., note 7 above.
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As occurred in interwar Canada, the rising stature of US research and a panoply of
Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation fellowships gradually encouraged
ambitious Australians to consider American forays.
59 Complementing Archibald Hill’s
Academic Assistance Council in Britain, these philanthropies further accelerated trans-
national intellectual exchange by relocating expatriate German scientists to Australia
from 1933 onwards. Max “Rudi” Lemberg joined the Kolling Institute and Bernard
Katz the Kanematsu, while Wilhelm Feldberg worked at the Hall Institute from 1936
to 1938.
60 A talented pharmacologist central to Henry Dale’s Nobel Prize-winning
work on chemical neurotransmission, Feldberg keenly felt the Australian disdain for
research, lamenting that “outside the institute there is a desert scientifically, and that is
often a little depressing after London”.
61
Given such unpromising soil for their germinal enterprises, how did Australian insti-
tute directors transplant and nurture the seeds they had brought with them from afar?
In analysing the establishment and ultimate dissolution of the Sydney Cancer Research
Committee between 1922 and 1938, Hamersley elucidates some of the complexity that
governed success or failure of Australian medical research enterprises during the inter-
war era.
62 Among the contributors to success were a vision and commitment to research
as a professional undertaking, considered financial management, administrative disci-
pline, scientific leadership and diversity of research programmes. Louella McCarthy’s
study of Sydney’s Rachel Forster Hospital over the same period identifies factors of
equal importance, including the ideologies and connections of the institution’s propo-
nents, the creation of a profitable niche for the venture, and a willingness to nuance insti-
tutional rhetoric better to meet political needs in an era of increasing government
responsibility for health.
63 In particular, McCarthy ascribes considerable value to the
personal and professional qualities of key staff members. Working within the framework
erected by these two scholars, I maintain that the Hall Institute under Charles Kellaway
represented the most successful Australian research enterprise of the interwar years. In
charting Kellaway’s models and methods, I hope concurrently to demonstrate why the
paths travelled by his contemporaries were less salutary, both for their institutes and
for the deeper soil within which medical research became locally self-sustaining.
58Brogan, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 5.
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Biol. Biomed. Sci., 2000, 31: 477–89; Walter and
Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research archives
(hereafter WEHA), Melbourne, WEHA00043,
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10Kellaway entered Melbourne University in 1907, determined to become a medical
missionary in India.
64 Despite ructions in his training caused by the faculty’s new
emphasis on pre-clinical sciences, he became one of its “most brilliant graduates”, sub-
sequently earning both MD and MS degrees.
65 Like almost a third of Australian doctors,
he served during the First World War, an experience that demolished his religious faith
but reinforced the value of imperial exchange in medical ideas, techniques and organiza-
tion.
66 The conflict also provided Kellaway with two enormously serendipitous connec-
tions. In Egypt with the Australian Army Medical Corps, he worked as a bacteriologist
under Charles Martin, who described Kellaway in 1916 as “a delightfully keen and
very able young man [and] a good Pathologist”.
67 Their field research on dysentery
formed the basis for Kellaway’s first scientific contributions to the medical literature.
68
Attached to the Australian Flying Corps two years later in London, he was encouraged
to undertake investigations under Henry Dale at what became the National Institute of
Medical Research (NIMR), then housed at the Lister Institute. Dale, already an eminent
pharmacologist and physiologist, was impressed with Kellaway’s “keenness, aptitude
and conscientious industry” during studies on anoxaemia at altitude.
69
In addition to its military applications, Kellaway’s research intimately connected him
with the bloc of influential physiologists whose wartime work was fostered by the British
Medical Research Committee (from 1920 the Medical Research Council, MRC).
70 As
argued particularly by Steve Sturdy, the conflict and its aftermath had provided these
basic scientists with opportunities not merely to expand their clinical role, but to promul-
gate a culture of experiment across military and political establishments.
71 Unlike
his Australian peers whose post-Armistice banners unfurled in public health, social med-
icine or outright eugenics, Kellaway’s ambitions never ran to reshaping society in the
mould of scientific medicine.
72 Nevertheless, he did not fail to appreciate the growing
64There is currently no full biography of
Kellaway. The only autobiographical account of any
length is RSL, ‘Charles H. Kellaway personal
information file’, c.1944; for detailed obituaries, see
H H Dale, ‘Charles Halliley Kellaway, 1889–1952’,
Obit. Not. Fellows R. Soc., 1953, 8: 502–21;
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Med. J. Aust., 1953, 1: 203–7.
65Russell, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 98–103,
109–10; Anon., ‘Dr. C. H. Kellaway’, The Age
(Melbourne), 14 Dec. 1952.
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medicine in Australia 1788–1939, Forrest, A J Proust,
2003, p. 237; National Archives of Australia
(hereafter NAA), Canberra, Series B2455, ‘Charles
Halliley Kellaway, personal service record 1915–20’;
Frank Kellaway to Peter Hobbins (in possession of
the author), Feb. 2007, p. 1.
67Basser Library, Australian Academy of
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dated 26 April) 1916.
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March to August 1916’, J. R. Army Med. Corps,
1918, 30: 101–2.
69Dale, op. cit., note 64 above, pp. 505–6; C H
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renal glands, Special report series (Great Britain.
Medical Research Committee) 37, London, His
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1919.
70See National Health Insurance, Fifth annual
report of the Medical Research Committee
1918–1919, London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office,
1919, pp. 22–3; T Michael Gibson and Michael H
Harrison, ‘Aviation medicine in the United Kingdom:
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11confluence between scientific and bureaucratic modes of management, nor the opportu-
nities it presented for British medical scientists. Indeed, Burnet later remarked of
Kellaway: “Clearly there would be a London flavour to whatever he created in Australia
and he may well have had the Lister Institute in mind as a model.”
73
Despite Martin’s early influence, however, Kellaway’s time at the Lister was super-
seded by subsequent templates. Upon repatriation to Australia, he taught briefly in
Adelaide before winning the inaugural Foulerton Studentship offered by the Royal
Society of London. This stipend enabled him to return to Britain, working from 1920
to 1923 in the laboratories of some of the most influential medical researchers of
the time.
74 In his first year he resumed work with Dale at the new NIMR in Hampstead,
followed by a brief sojourn with Charles Sherrington at Oxford University before settling
at the University College Hospital (UCH) in London under Thomas Elliott.
While Sherrington’s department represented the established model of fundamental
physiological research isolated from clinical practice,
75 post-war London was a ferment
of new structures and practices. Contrasting with the rearguard action fought by case-
based clinicians,
76 the NIMR epitomized the ascendance of “modern”, problem-based
research that had developed during the war.
77 While the institute operated ostensibly
as four departments—biochemistry and pharmacology, applied physiology, bacteriology,
and statistics—Dale’s collaborative approach overrode these nominal boundaries. This
credo manifested formally in the open layout of his laboratories and the constitution of
cross-disciplinary teams, and informally via discussions across shared benches and at
tea-breaks.
78 The specific conception of “team work” promulgated by Dale—problem-
driven, interdisciplinary collaboration between laboratory scientists—was the model
endorsed by Walter Fletcher at the MRC in his quest to winkle clinicians out of basic
research.
79 Its effect on Kellaway’s institutional imaginings can be detected in statements
he made after returning to Australia:
...in these days when a problem has to be tackled it often requires team work of a very high order.
It may require an expert bio-chemist, another expert in morbid anatomy, another in experimental
73Burnet, op. cit., note 50 above, p. 22.
74Both Martin and Dale were members of the
Foulerton Research Fund Managing Committee; see
RSL, CMB/64/4, ‘Minutes, meeting of the Foulerton
Research Fund Managing Committee’, 22 Nov. 1922;
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Notes Rec. R. Soc., 2008, 62: 123–30.
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century Britain’, Med. Hist., 1999, 43: 421–49;
Christopher Lawrence, ‘Still incommunicable:
clinical holists and medical knowledge in interwar
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1920–1950, New York and Oxford, Oxford
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77Robert E Kohler, ‘Walter Fletcher, F. G.
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69: 331–55, pp. 336–40.
78Elliot S Valenstein, The war of the soups and
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Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 50; E M Tansey,
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12medicine, and a fourth in bacteriology; they may all be needed for an adequate solution of a
problem ...Team work is becoming essential, and if we want to foster research work in this coun-
try it is very important to develop the idea of doing it in proximity to people who are grappling the
problems side by side, and supplementing the deficiencies in each other.
80
It is clear from this rhetoric that despite his military service and hospital training under
aloof consultants, Kellaway favoured an egalitarian, “side by side” conception of team
work—the “group work” that Canadian researchers had so spectacularly employed in
the 1922 discovery of insulin.
81 This ethos was borne out at the Hall Institute where—
like both Dale and Martin—Kellaway’s contribution to others’ projects was to advise
and enthuse, rather than to dictate or discipline.
82 He thus eschewed the alternative
“hierarchical teamwork” approach that was accelerating internationally as research pro-
grammes grew in size and complexity, and as the power base of ambitious laboratory
chiefs expanded commensurately.
83
Yet Kellaway’s practice veered away from another key aspect of Dale’s “team work”,
namely the hermetic separation of laboratory and clinic. He never lost his physician’s
desire to treat individual patients, nor could he deny his institute’s role in addressing
the pressing needs of hospital cases and community epidemics such as poliomyelitis.
84
This constitutional unwillingness to abandon clinical practice was not uncommon—
either locally or internationally—but it was certainly fostered by the Hall Institute’s
conceptualization as a subsidiary of the Melbourne Hospital, as well as the prevailing
pragmatism of Australian science.
85 As a result, Kellaway promoted a porous,
problem-driven approach to team work at the Hall Institute, encouraging both loose
and formalized alliances between laboratory workers and clinicians.
This inclusive stance also betrayed Kellaway’s years within London’s University
College Hospital complex, which in the early 1920s piloted the integration of teaching,
research and clinical practice into a cohesive medical “unit”.
86 The UCH unit—
encompassing interlinked hospital, university and laboratory facilities—was generously
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation as a model for reforming British medical training
along Flexnerian lines. The application of physiological techniques to UCH patients was
illustrated by Kellaway’s collaboration with Thomas Elliott to standardize insulin dosing,
privileging quantifiable biochemical measurements over clinical observation.
87 While
remaining wary of veering too far from “problems with direct practical application to
80Syme, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 231.
81Smith, op. cit., note 79 above, p. 278; Li, op.
cit., note 59 above, pp. 44–54.
82Tansey, op. cit., note 78 above, p. 1341;
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Institute, London, Andre Deutsch, 1971, p. 70; Wood,
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83The term is Andrew Hull’s (op. cit., note 2
above, pp. 579–80); see also Li, op. cit., note 24
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pp. 266–75.
84C H Kellaway, The sixth annual report of the
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Research in
Pathology and Medicine, Melbourne, The Walter and
Eliza Hall Institute, 1926, pp. 8–9.
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Edwards, Control and the therapeutic trial: rhetoric
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Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2007, pp. 16–17.
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13formal medicine”,
88 Kellaway also apprehended the ascendance of academic medicine in
the new London schema, having served as acting Professor of Anatomy (1915) and then
acting Professor of Physiology (1919) at the University of Adelaide. Indeed, upon return-
ing to Australia in 1923, Kellaway persevered for twenty years in seeking to position the
Hall Institute in closer relation both to the Melbourne Hospital and Melbourne Universi-
ty—in essence to replicate the triumvirate of facilities that made up the UCH unit.
“A More or Less Complex Unit”
On arriving atthe Hall Institute in 1923, Kellaway set about remaking it along more mod-
ern London lines. Although the institute ostensibly comprised departments of bacteriology,
biochemistry, histology, serology and experimental pathology, these appear to have been a
farrago of routine clinical services rather than dedicated research streams.
89 An early step
was to coalesce these erratic methodologies into specific departments reflecting those at
the NIMR, namely physiology, bacteriology and biochemistry.
90 Although, like Dale,
Kellaway continued to construct project teams across the institute, the formalized depart-
ments provided his researchers with a degree of autonomy and the disciplinary identity
necessary to develop and disseminate their expertise. Yet unlike other scientific empire
builders of the period, he neither favoured his own department nor stifled the emergence
of new divisions.
91 Indeed, Kellaway not only fostered Burnet’s emerging virology labora-
tory;after 1935 hegaveit precedenceoverhis own work inthe institute’s annualreports. By
the end of that decade, the Hall Institute also boasted a pioneering blood transfusion service
and moved towards clinical research in immunization.
In accommodating such diverse interests among established and potential investiga-
tors, this multiplicity of experimental disciplines enhanced the Hall Institute’s appeal
as a local centre for aspiring medical scientists. In contrast, most other Australian insti-
tutes focused on only one or two research streams: the AITM on tropical physiology, the
Kolling Institute on biochemistry, the Kanematsu on neurophysiology, and the Baker on
both bacteriology and biochemistry.
92 Rather than specializing to dominate specific
fields, such narrow directions were a bald recognition of financial stringency. However,
these strictures left the new research ventures on shaky ground. In his study of the
Sydney Cancer Research Committee, for instance, Hamersley notes that failure of the
programme’s central research thrust was a major factor in its dissolution;
93 Warwick
Anderson likewise observes that completion of the AITM’s physiological studies left
the facility rudderless after 1920.
94
88University of Adelaide Library, Adelaide,
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14Stability was thus a further benefit of Kellaway’s experiment with diversifying the
Hall Institute’s research. While Burnet later suggested that this dissipated its strengths,
Kellaway’s wider mission was to nurture a broad base of trained medical researchers
who could in turn develop their own programmes or institutions.
95 This vision was not
his alone; it was echoed by Cumpston at the inaugural meeting of the National Health
and Medical Research Council (NH&MRC) in 1937.
96 However, by that stage Kellaway
had been providing practical support to budding researchers for nearly fifteen years.
In fact, the palpable success of the Hall Institute led other local institute boards to
consult with Kellaway in creating their own structures. Both the Baker and the post-
war Queensland Institute of Medical Research actively modelled their operations on
aspects of the Hall Institute,
97 while Kellaway was specifically commissioned to draft
criteria for the director of the Kanematsu Institute, urging the appointment of John
“Jack” Eccles in that role.
98
Well aware of the absence of local research opportunities and mentors, Kellaway was
also assiduous in providing multiple working arrangements to tempt and nurture aspiring
investigators. Even before his arrival, the institute had encouraged students and voluntary
workers into full- or part-time research,
99 but Kellaway extended an offer to “co-operate
with Honorary Physicians and Surgeons in carrying out special investigations of pro-
blems, and to help in elucidating obscure cases”; indeed, the facility and its staff were
“available for investigation of medical problems arising in all parts of the State”.
100 In
addition to permanent employees, working relationships supported by the Hall Institute
included visiting positions and training roles: even registrars willing to commit just
two hours per week were encouraged.
101 In promoting this porous conception of team
work, Kellaway fostered a plexus of relationships between his laboratory and clinical
medicine, claiming that “the whole institute forms a more or less complex unit [with
the Melbourne Hospital]”.
102
Although far from the only contemporary example—as Hull and Sturdy have demon-
strated in the UK, for instance—this hybrid structure served important goals in interwar
Australia.
103 Kellaway repeatedly encouraged fellow doctors to systematize their prac-
tices, urging that there was “not one of us who may not make some contribution to
knowledge” via clinical, diagnostic or basic sciences.
104 The range of investigations
undertaken at the Hall Institute similarly configured “scientific medicine” as a
continuum of practices spanning isolated physiological preparations through to hospital
95C H Kellaway, ‘The Sir Richard Stawell
oration’, Med. J. Aust., 1938, 1: 365–74, p. 370.
96J H L Cumpston, ‘Appendix I. Inaugural
address’, Sixty years of the National Health
and Medical Research Council 1936–1996,
Canberra, Australian Government Printing Service,
1996 (facsimile of 1937 document), pp. 83–98, on
p. 88.
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99S W Patterson, ‘Post-graduate research work’,
The Speculum, Nov. 1922: 199–201, p. 200.
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15autopsies.
105 Moreover, this schema allowed the institute to operate on many levels: by
1941 it supported both Australia’s first repository of frozen serum for blood transfusion
and the publication of Burnet’s pivotal monograph on immunological theory.
106
The necessity to retain a pragmatic appeal to clinicians was highlighted by Sydney’s
hospital-bound institutes. At the Kolling, Max Lemberg echoed Feldberg’s sense of
scientific desolation, describing his research environment as a “wilderness” bereft of sup-
port from Australian colleagues.
107 At the Kanematsu—where the later Nobel laureates
Eccles and Katz undertook basic neurophysiological studies—local clinicians and
the hospital board were so antagonistic that both soon resigned for overseas posts.
108
Geographical remoteness could be just as damning; the Australian Institute of Anatomy
would almost certainly have fared better if the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons
had relocated from Melbourne to Canberra, as initially intended.
109 More directly, as
the federal health purview shifted from the tropical north to the populous south of
the continent, the AITM’s very location in northern Queensland broadcast its peripheral
status. Although reasons for its demise were multifarious, the AITM’s isolation from




Safely ensconced in central Melbourne, Kellaway repeatedly projected his
institute outwards to garner both clinical and political support from the medical frater-
nity. Whilst specialists pursued medical research to enhance the stature and autonomy
of their disciplines in interwar Britain,
111 the limited scale of local investigations urges
caution in extending this argument to Australia. There is little doubt, however, that
Kellaway’s alliance with hospital consultants benefited the Hall Institute, particularly
as specialists increasingly came to dominate Australian medical politics between the
wars.
112 An eminently “clubbable” man, he considered consultants and academics his
milieu, and throughout the period he remained an honorary physician at the Melbourne
Hospital.
Kellaway furthermore taught and examined numerous clinicians for fellowship in the
English and Australian professional colleges, especially under the aegis of the Melbourne
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16Permanent Committee for Post-Graduate Work.
113 Indeed, he was the only institute direc-
tor to become a foundation councillor of the Association of Physicians of Australasia
in 1930. From 1938 he served in a similar capacity for the new Royal Australasian
College of Physicians, prior to being elected vice-president in 1942—a significant
achievement for a “non-clinician”.
114 Although the creation of local specialist colleges
challenged the hegemony of the British Medical Association as the main political body
for Australian doctors, local BMA branches nevertheless retained considerable power
through the interwar era.
115 A steadfast presenter at state and national BMA meetings,
Kellaway both promoted the value of his institute and encouraged the Association to
lobby for Commonwealth government funding of research.
116
In addition to this clinical concatenation, Kellaway followed the lead of Martin and
Dale in establishing his own networks of patronage for “first-rate fellows” wishing to
undertake research. Indeed, his unselfish support for the careers of others—from senior
scientists literally through to cleaners—epitomizes recollections of Kellaway.
117
Undoubtedly the most profound of his sponsorships was Burnet, who joined the Hall
Institute only months before Kellaway arrived. He arranged for Burnet to earn his PhD
under Martin at the Lister Institute and—fuelled by Kellaway’s good reports—Dale sub-
sequently offered Burnet a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship to undertake virus
research at the NIMR.
118 Thus was the cycle perpetuated. Moreover, it was a pattern
that Kellaway recapitulated throughout his career, extending to his directorship of the
Wellcome Research Institution from 1944 to 1952.
119
This process was not, however, destined to favour Kellaway’s own research in basic
physiology and pharmacology. The interwar years have been rendered a gilded age for
experimental physiology: championed by Abraham Flexner, generously supported by
the MRC in Britain, driving patentable therapeutic innovations in North America and
garnering scientific kudos across Europe.
120 In Australia, Kellaway’s experimental pro-
gramme on Australian snake venoms was critical in enabling him to provide scientific
113For example, Frank Kellaway op. cit., note 66
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17leadership at the Hall Institute.
121 These studies immediately generated concrete clinical
outcomes, including guidelines on management of envenomed patients and collaboration
with CSL to manufacture the first local antivenene.
122 Furthermore, Kellaway’s corpus
of work in this field—over sixty published papers—earned him accolades including
the Fellowship of the Royal Society of London and the prestigious 1936 Charles E
Dohme Memorial Lectureship at Johns Hopkins University. The associated kudos
ensured Kellaway’s status as a significant scientific actor, both in the domestic setting
and in negotiation with international bodies such as the Rockefeller Foundation.
123
Beyond the Hall Institute, however, Kellaway’s “physiological experiment” faltered.
While his international scientific credentials were acknowledged, his oeuvre of venom
studies was perceived as interesting but peripheral to clinical medicine.
124 Perhaps hop-
ing to bolster physiology locally, Kellaway had invited Feldberg to sojourn at the Hall
Institute and was instrumental in drawing Eccles to the Kanematsu.
125 However, after
two years Feldberg chose the more cosmopolitan environment of Cambridge, while
Eccles’ programme with Katz and Stephen Kuffler was stifled by academic isolation
and marginalized as “remote from clinical usefulness”.
126 Tropical physiology had pros-
pered briefly at the AITM before 1920 and developed again in Queensland from the late
1930s, but few centres pursued physiological investigations beyond anthropological
fieldwork and wartime trials for adaptation of military personnel to tropical service.
127
Coupled with the absence of pharmaceutical industry research, physiology thus never
supplanted bacteriology as the epitome of medical science in interwar Australia. This
patchy record furthermore confirmed that, unlike basic research programmes in the
northern hemisphere, Australian medical science could not subsist on the premise that
fundamental discoveries would—ultimately—inform better clinical practice.
More successful, however, were Kellaway’s attempts to complete the “unit” triad by
negotiating a closer relationship with the University of Melbourne. Throughout the era,
he ensured that Hall Institute staff maintained clinical posts at the Melbourne Hospital
and teaching positions at the university, both to promote the institute and to spot poten-
tial talent. However, most of the early Australian institutes shared few enduring pro-
grammes with local universities—certainly not in the new London mould—although
eager students occasionally undertook short-term projects.
128 While academic staff
held positions on the Hall Institute board, the facility had always been more closely
aligned with the hospital, sharing as they did both personnel and physical locations. As
121For a detailed review of Kellaway’s scientific
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18the need for the hospital to relocate became more pressing during the 1920s, a site
became available adjacent to Melbourne University. Kellaway seized this opportunity
not just to secure more modern premises, but physically to locate the Hall Institute where
he felt it belonged conceptually: between a university and a major teaching hospital.
More pragmatically, he hoped that this reconfiguration might allow the institute to dis-
pense with its routine duties and focus on cooperative research with the university.
129
The move alsoprompted Kellaway topropose thatthe directorofthe Hall Institute should
become Australia’s first professor of experimental medicine. This was not mere vainglory:
Melbourne University acknowledged that the arrangement “would secure an outstanding
investigator and organizer for the chair at relatively small cost”.
130 Mirroring Dale’s super-
vision of the NIMR’s redesign, Kellaway put aside his directorial duties for three months in
1936 to plan both the new hospital and his own establishment.
131 In the event, the Hall Insti-
tute remained physically and contractually attached to the hospital at its new site, a prag-
matic financial compromise that moreover allowed researchers to retain ward beds.
However,the negotiations which had started in1926werenot finalizeduntil 1944, bywhich
time Burnet had succeeded to the directorship: Kellaway never became professor of experi-
mental medicine.
132 Nevertheless, on the eve of the Second World War, he was compen-
sated by having established the first functioning medical research unit in Australia.
Solvency and Science
Narratives of the early Australian institutes bemoan equally a stultifying bondage to
clinical medicine and an enduring quest for financial independence. This is frequently
a teleological tale in which scientific toil and talent are finally rewarded in 1937 by a
deus ex machina, viz. the National Health and Medical Research Council.
133 Yet as
international circumstances illustrate, neither federal support for medical research in
Australia, nor the form it finally took, were inevitable. Rather, these structures were con-
tingent both upon the prevailing clinical focus of local medicine and numerous financial
experiments undertaken by Kellaway and his compatriots. Thus while the structure of
interwar Australian institutes reflected European exemplars, their funding arrangements
more closely resembled North American models. British support for national medical
science, for instance, was formalized via the MRC in 1913, yet predated by the Indian
Research Fund Association, which fostered colonial medical scientists and their institutes
from 1911.
134 In Canada, by contrast, the National Research Council only sporadically
funded medical science prior to the Second World War, while in the USA the National
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19Institute of Health (1930) represented the first major federal support for biomedical
research.
135
Unsurprisingly, both Australian and American institutional histories spanning the
Depression emphasize not only the need for sound financial management, but reveal
that research programmes—and their rhetoric—were frequently tailored to accommodate
potential sources of income.
136 Where they differed, however, was in the scale of non-
government funding. Whereas the millions offered by the Rockefeller Foundation,
Carnegie Corporation and Nuffield Foundation called the tune for numerous northern
universities and institutes, in Australia the sums proffered were several orders of magni-
tude lower. For instance, the estate of Thomas Baker, Alice Baker and Eleanor Shaw
bestowed £3000 for facilities in 1926, the trustees of Fusajiro Kanematsu £25,000 in
1929, and Eva Kolling £5000 in 1930, while annual stipends included £2500 provided
by the Walter and Eliza Hall Trust in 1915 and £3500 by the Baker endowment a decade
later.
137 Many of these institutes’ allowances were supplemented by the associated hos-
pital or state government, but even by 1937 annual incomes rarely exceeded £10,000.
Moreover, much of this funding was contingent upon investment returns and partisan
political support. None of the institutes could be described as subsisting on a stable
financial base, nor could they anticipate the industry royalties that increasingly accrued
to products of basic research in Canada and the USA.
138 Indeed, this penury was a key
factor in the continuing appeal of clinical postings over a local career in research. Weary
of official antagonism and the uncertain future of the AITM, even Anton Breinl—the
first director of the first Australian institute—resigned in 1920 to pursue “more lucrative
private practice” in Townsville.
139
Arriving in 1923 from the well-resourced British laboratories, Kellaway was doubtless
shocked by the parsimony of the Hall Institute’s income. Even in 1927, Burnet remarked
from the Lister Institute that “The bill for animals and their maintenance here is over
£3000 a year. The W. & E. H [sic] has an income of about that extent to pay its staff
and run the whole show”.
140 Kellaway successfully campaigned for an increase in the
Institute’s annual stipend, but the more profound change was wrought in 1924 when
he obtained permission to seek funding outside the annual grant.
141 His courting of the
Melbourne establishment soon paid off, as his personal charm and growing coterie
attracted potential donors such as the medical industrialists George Nicholas and Russell
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142 Burnet later railed, “It is not fitting that a first class scientist should
have to go cap in hand for small sums wherever he could find them”, but in the 1920s
Kellaway had few alternatives.
143 He saw fundraising as a necessary yet unpleasant
duty, opining to one staff member, “The extraction process, Clyde, stinks a bit.”
144
Nevertheless, his efforts almost immediately secured a generous gift of £3000 to create
a library, followed by £1500 per annum for three years to establish the biochemistry
department. Additional donations followed, but these rapidly withered away after 1929.
Although the enormous potential of mass subscriptions had become apparent during
the First World War, such approaches to the populace were rarely undertaken by interwar
research institutions. Those which did were generally dismal failures. The Lister Institute
did not pursue general appeals and the NIMR was securely funded by the state.
145 While
St Mary’s Hospital Medical School in London experienced little trouble raising £105,000
to rebuild its inoculation department in the late 1920s, only £22,000 was generated exter-
nally.
146 The British Empire Cancer Campaign was constituted in 1923 on the premise of
a massive fund-raising scheme intended to secure £2 million for the Imperial Cancer
Research Fund, but receipts for both ventures fell far short of their goals.
147 Likewise,
in 1921, the nascent Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical and Preventive Medicine
set a target of $6 million via appeals to the American public. Despite strenuous fund-
raising efforts, the final income amounted to little over $9000; entreaties to state medical
societies brought in exactly $7. As Kellaway had found, significant public income only
eventuated when one motivated board member beseeched individual benefactors.
148 The
situation had worsened by 1930, when the embryonic National Institute of Health
attracted only $57 in public subscriptions. Despite a subsequent campaign of letter writ-
ing and personal visits to 3000 potential benefactors—even offering to target research to
diseases of personal relevance—by 1933 no further funds emerged.
149
One can thus appreciate why Kellaway pinned few hopes on the public as a potential
source of revenue; certainly the Baker, Kanematsu, and Kolling Institutes appear not to
have approached the populace for donations. The Hall Institute did, however, experiment
with an appeal in 1924 that achieved its limited objective of raising nearly £3000, but
this tactic was never repeated.
150 This is surprising given that the same period witnessed
the outstanding results achieved by the Sydney Cancer Research Committee. Hamersley
has outlined how this group crafted a highly successful fundraising strategy, enlisting a
cadre of business leaders and prominent citizens to raise £100,000.
151 They instigated
a public appeal which after several years had reached the creditable sum of
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21£23,000—equivalent to that sourced by St Mary’s Hospital in London. When re-
launched in July 1926 with a focus on funds being used for cancer treatment as well
as research, the appeal reached £130,000 within a year. Even allowing for the special
place cancer had occupied as a charitable cause since the turn of the century,
152 this
was a staggering sum, equivalent to over a decade’s annual expenditure for the Hall
Institute. The success of the Sydney Committee’s work was common knowledge at
the time, yet when their appeal closed in July 1927 Kellaway apparently did not contem-
plate a follow-on campaign. Instead, he turned to another, no less daunting source: the
Commonwealth government.
Fostering Federal Funding
Unlike the UK, where laboratory culture and scientific medicine largely predated— and
informed—government responsibility for health, in Australia this circumstance was essen-
tially reversed. Thus formalized research institutes not only had to negotiate with practi-
tioners and academics for a place in the medical hegemony; in a sense they also
competed against the federal government in siphoning authority from clinical medicine.
Whilst the Commonwealth Department of Health was formed only in 1921 and remained
closely under Treasury scrutiny, its Director-General—Cumpston—was nationalist,
expansionist and autocratic. In his schema, medical research sat below public health and
quarantine measures as a national priority.
153 Indeed, in the wake of the 1925 Royal
Commission on Health, he had overseen the winding down of the federally funded AITM.
Kellaway was well aware of the monies provided to British research institutions by
the MRC, and the priority it accorded basic physiological, pathological and biochem-
ical investigations.
154 Indeed, he was among a number of university deans and institute
directors who lobbied alongside the BMA for the formation of an equivalent body in
Australia.
155 Cumpston, however, was opposed to replicating the structure, operation
and largesse of the MRC, which he believed “would at the best produce an isolated
body weak in numbers and with limited influence—consisting moreover of persons
who would be administering funds from which they (professionally) would be the prin-
cipal beneficiaries”.
156 However, this did not signal that he was unsympathetic to med-
ical research per se.
157 Decades later, when Kellaway advised that he was leaving
Australia to take up the directorship of Scientific Policy for the Wellcome Research
Laboratories in London, Cumpston revealed that:
In 1924, in an interview between Sir Henry Welcome [sic] and myself, we arrived at an unwritten
gentlemen’s agreement that his interests would do nothing to disturb my attempts to establish
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22research in Australia on an Australian basis, and that he would do all he could to help ...[such
that] we have been left free ...to develop a rapidly expanding and very vigorous and successful
national spirit and practice of research.
158
Cumpston’s request was perhaps pointed. Henry Dale’s successor as Director of the
Wellcome Physiological Research Laboratories was Richard O’Brien, who held the
post from 1914 until 1940.
159 O’Brien—one of Cumpston’s former Melbourne Univer-
sity classmates—was another Australian who been imbued with the “Martin spirit” and
later claimed credit for helping inspire the AITM’s establishment, yet in 1910 he had
chosen instead to join the Lister Institute.
160 Nevertheless, there was certainly a degree
of truth in Cumpston’s epistle: the Commonwealth government first experimented with
funding independent medical research just prior to the 1925 Royal Commission. This
commenced, “after a good deal of negotiation”, with a grant of £750 to assist cancer
research conducted by Thomas Cherry, the John Grice Cancer Research Fellow
whose studies were endorsed by Kellaway and accommodated at the Hall Institute.
161
The Royal Commission also resulted in the formation of a Federal Health Council,
which resolved at its first meeting in January 1927 that “cancer research work should
be subsidized as far as practicable” and—buoyed by a substantial budget surplus—began
disbursing funds for selected cancer projects the following year.
162
Thus when Kellaway first approached the Minister of Health for a Commonwealth
research grant in November 1927, he was not peremptorily turned away. Cumpston,
however, remained the gatekeeper to Kellaway’s persistent and adroit entreaties; as chief
advisor to successive health ministers, his relationship to Australian medical research
echoed that of Walter Morley Fletcher at Britain’s MRC.
163 Cumpston was aware of
Kellaway’s slow but steady progress in building the profile and finances of the Hall Insti-
tute; furthermore, the networks Kellaway had established—and the standing of his
institute’s scientific work—provided a strong basis for negotiation. Acting on
Cumpston’s recommendation, the Minister immediately responded to Kellaway’s propo-
sal and awarded £2500 for work in the areas of snake venoms, hydatid disease, cancer
diagnosis and infantile paralysis (polio).
164
This pioneering bestowal of federal subsidies was by no means assured. Cumpston had
turned down several entreaties by his own Commonwealth Serum Laboratories for
research funds, and his stranglehold on health finances certainly worked against
Kellaway’s opposite number at the Baker Institute, William Penfold. Indeed—like Breinl
before him at the AITM—Penfold had resigned as director of CSL in 1927 after falling
foul of Cumpston.
165 By early 1928, as director at the Baker, he had spearheaded a quite
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23public submission for the federal government to establish a “Medical Research Council
to consist of research men, with parliamentary representation ... [and] to keep the
Council away from the Public Service control”.
166 Given such impolitic rhetoric, it is
unsurprising that the Baker received no government funding throughout Penfold’s tenure
as director. This situation also occasioned inter-institutional jealousies: in 1932, with
the Baker facing closure on account of financial stringencies, its chairman of trustees
publicly wrote:
The policy of the Federal Government in the matter of research is well known; the late Govern-
ment came to the assistance of a sister research unit, the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute associated
with the Melbourne Hospital, to the extent of several thousands of pounds. It was on the eve of
making a similar grant to us when the great depression arrived, and asked us to waive our claim
for the time being. Surely the present Government will not fail us in this crisis.
167
Despite this rather disingenuous rendering of the Hall Institute subsidy, neither state nor
Commonwealth funds were forthcoming.
Conversely, the positive press attention garnered by the Hall Institute precedent re-
inforced the political value of the small sums allocated (£10,200 over four years).
Kellaway’s position was further strengthened by the sterling service he provided the
Commonwealth as chair of a Royal Commission into the 1928 “Bundaberg tragedy”,
in which twelve children died after receiving contaminated diphtheria toxin-antitoxin
manufactured by CSL.
168 Claire Hooker and Alison Bashford have detailed the centrality
of diphtheria prevention to the Commonwealth’s expanding immunization strategy,
suggesting how vital it was for the investigation—which included considerable work at
the Hall Institute—comprehensively to address this public health disaster.
169 As a result
of its painstaking scientific studies, Kellaway’s Commission vindicated the Common-
wealth’s flagship programme while projecting the pragmatic value of medical research
to a sceptical nation.
170
Nevertheless, federal budget cuts curtailed the Commonwealth’s fiscal experiment in
1931. By 1934, with the Hall Institute’s funds at a nadir,
171 Kellaway initiated a new tac-
tic by inviting the Commonwealth to join the Rockefeller Foundation in supporting the
establishment of a virus research department at his institute. Christopher Sexton asserts
that Burnet instigated this proposal, but he considerably understates Kellaway’s contribu-
tion both as a negotiator and as head of a recognized centre of excellence.
172 Indeed,
while Burnet’s personal reputation certainly contributed, without an appropriate infra-
structure and depth of research across an institute, Rockefeller funding was far from
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24assured however talented its individual scientists might be.
173 Kellaway was not only
aware that Foundation funds had been instrumental to Cumpston’s “intelligent oppor-
tunism” in creating a Commonwealth Department of Health;
174 he was also personally
known to the Rockefeller administrators via his Bundaberg inquiry and had himself
received a Foundation fellowship to visit the USA in 1933.
175 His entrenched relation-
ship with the Australian health bureaucracy, coupled with the Hall Institute’s record as
a stable and productive research institution, facilitated the success of the virus laboratory
scheme. Yet once again—as was the case with federal funding—Morgan was given short
shrift when the Baker Institute sought Rockefeller Foundation support.
176
Commonwealth interest in the virus research programme was also piqued by
Kellaway’s astute proposal that it should comprise a joint venture with CSL which might
lead to marketable vaccines.
177 The initiative thus formed a relatively rare interwar
example of research–industry cooperation in Australia, at a time when such relationships
were becoming entrenched in America.
178 It was not the first: CSL had collaborated with
the Hall Institute previously to produce antivenenes and with the Victorian Department
for Public Health to develop a polio vaccine.
179 However, whilst the virus programme
represented CSL’s entre ´e into basic research, as a Commonwealth enterprise it was
something of a special case. Despite his relationship with local pharmaceutical entrepre-
neurs such as George Nicholas, Kellaway seems never to have sought more formal
industry ties to commercialize the Hall Institute’s findings. While “Henry Dale in the
UK and A. N. Richards in the USA were ‘everywhere’ in pharmaceuticals”,
180 Kellaway
fostered industry relationships only for benefaction, not for collaboration. Thus while
this makes his subsequent appointment to an ostensibly commercial venture—the
Wellcome Research Institution—somewhat surprising, by the late 1930s there was clearly
no doubt as to Kellaway’s impressive skills as a science administrator and negotiator.
Deus ex Machina?
The virus research programme furthermore confirmed Kellaway’s appreciation of the
scientific and political capital to be made from the imprimatur of the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. Internationally, it garnered substantial scientific kudos for Kellaway, Burnet and
the Hall Institute, while within Australia it confirmed—at federal cabinet level—the
potential worth of medical research at a time when parliament was considering the crea-
tion of a National Health and Medical Research Council. Indeed, the 1934 virus grant
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25was renewed in 1936 and became one of the few arrangements transferred to the new
funding system in 1937.
181
The historian Michael Roe has commented of the NH&MRC that “for the first time
in Australian history the value of medical research was recognized as an asset in
the national economy”.
182 In a general sense this is true, but Kellaway’s pioneering
requests for federal grants in the preceding decade had been very much couched—and
approved—in the rhetoric of national interest. It has also been noted that—in contrast
to Cumpston’s concerns about an MRC-styled self-serving body—there were in fact no
representatives of medical research institutions sitting on the NH&MRC at its forma-
tion.
183 Ostensibly this is correct, but Kellaway had spent a decade amicably interacting
with the Council’s foundation chairman, the omnipresent Cumpston. Furthermore, one of
the three members of the Council’s Medical Research Advisory Committee was Harold
Dew, a senior surgeon who had spent five years at the Hall Institute and was favourably
disposed towards Kellaway.
184 As a foundation member of the Association of Physicians
of Australasia, which was also represented, Kellaway’s assiduous networking once more
bore fruit. Indeed, the Hall Institute became, and for many years remained, the single lar-
gest beneficiary of NH&MRC funds, although Kellaway shared a concern with fellow
investigators that increasing state control might jeopardize the autonomy of research.
185
Nevertheless, the Council itself had to fight for its initial endowment and, in financing
only specific programmes, its outlays never guaranteed the running expenses of local
institutes.
186 In fact, the Depression had thrown the tenuous finances of Australian med-
ical research into stark relief: by 1932, even the government’s scattered Commonwealth
Health Laboratories were in jeopardy.
187 Likewise, despite sporadic attempts to increase
the Baker Institute’s funding base, it survived only through severe retrenchments and
shoring up by the Alfred Hospital and two key benefactors.
188 A starker contrast is pro-
vided by the Sydney Cancer Research Committee, whose funds had totalled £130,000 in
1927 and whose staff numbers had rivalled those of the Hall Institute before the stock
market crash.
189 Its administrators, however, were profligate to the point of recklessness,
leading to the operation being wound up in 1938. Indeed, the director of research, Henry
Chapman, committed suicide in 1934 when accused of misappropriating nearly £20,000
from other programmes.
190
Kellaway, too, had a difficult time. Vivianne de Vahl Davis believes that the Hall
Institute faced closure in the depths of the Depression, as annual income dwindled
from £10,509 in 1928–9 to £5525 in 1934–5. She agreed with Burnet that “any other
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26man ...would have given up the struggle and returned to work in England where he had
both an excellent scientific reputation and influential friends”.
191 However, Kellaway
excelled in economizing and while his administrative record was not without fault, his
personal integrity and skills both as a fundraiser and financial manager were critical to
the success of his fragile operation throughout the 1930s. Moreover, in securing the
Hall Institute’s pioneering federal grants, his experiments had contributed to the ground-
work for the NH&MRC. While this helped free succeeding directors from repeating his
“cap in hand” forays, it was no panacea; by 1943 Kellaway was repeating a refrain famil-
iar the world over: “All [of the Australian] Institutions need support, none of them being
provided with an endowment sufficient for its needs.”
192
Conclusions:
Cultural Accommodations and Local Exemplars
One can readily argue that any institution adapting to its historical environment con-
stitutes a ceaseless “experiment” in projecting corporate needs and accommodating local
contingencies. What set apart the Australian medical research institutes of the early
twentieth century, however, was their proponents’ studious attempts to graft models
that had evolved outside the local culture onto parochial medical structures. James
Gillespie, for instance, argues that an analogous process was undertaken by the Interna-
tional Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, whose 1919–24 hookworm cam-
paign unsuccessfully sought to formalize Australian health bureaucracies along rigidly
American lines.
193 Rather than dogmatically persisting with received prototypes, how-
ever, the early research institutes reconfigured themselves time and again to thrive in
this unpromising soil. It was only via such protean measures that a handful of endeavours
were able to embed themselves in the local medical culture, negotiating a limited degree
of independence and continuity for the pursuit of basic science. In this regard, the Hall
Institute was undoubtedly the most successful of the pre-1939 ventures, as the structures
set up by Kellaway came increasingly to dominate Australian conceptions of a medical
research institute.
194
But this was merely an evolutionary formula for survival, not prosperity. Even after
the formation of the NH&MRC, the early institutes could conceivably have remained
clinical appendages subsisting on short-term, pragmatic investigations. Indeed, this was
the path taken by most centres after the outbreak of war in 1939. Despite a vast increase
in federal support, routine duties such as blood grouping of service personnel prolifer-
ated, while research agendas were tightly directed toward the pressing needs of national
efficiency and defence.
195 The concordance of research institutes with this national
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27mobilization was understandable, but betrayed the still-fragile foundations underlying
basic science and exacerbated their financial dependence on the Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, by the late 1930s—and certainly after 1945—it was clear that a cultural
shift had occurred in Australian attitudes towards medical research. Swelling university
enrolments and the instigation of a fourth medical faculty at the University of Queens-
land (1936) certainly contributed, as did an influx of philanthropic support for integrating
research into teaching.
196 The idea—if not the initial reality—of the NH&MRC also
embodied a new national commitment to original investigations, and was lauded by clini-
cians and scientists alike. The astounding clinical success of penicillin and Howard
Florey’s 1945 Nobel Prize clearly inspired his compatriots, although he himself was
never quite persuaded to work in Australia.
197 Thus although the post-war environment
remained far from ideal, and senior investigators including Kellaway continued to
depart for more conducive overseas facilities through the 1940s,
198 medical science
was increasingly seen as a rewarding career that Australians could—and should—pursue
in their homeland.
Above all, it was the seminal research institutes that had consistently provided the
exemplars, facilities and infrastructure to foster this new perception. This was certainly
the case for the Hall Institute, which in 1948 Florey opined had “brought more renown
to Australian research than any other Institute”.
199 Beyond ensuring the bare survival
of his laboratory Kellaway had projected a culture of experiment outwards, titrating
incremental changes in hospital practice, clinical teaching, health policy, fiscal support
and public benefaction. His institute remained more than an isolated centre for basic
science; it became a site of national interest, even pride. In negotiating a wider cultural
role for medical research far from London, Paris or Berlin, Charles Kellaway’s experi-
ments paralleled those of James “Bert” Collip in Canada or Argentina’s Bernardo
Houssay.
200 In this sense he had remained, indeed, a “medical missionary”.
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